STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A zero-one law for Boolean privacy
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Everything provable is provable in zero-knowledge
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings on Advances in cryptology
Distributed games: from mechanisms to protocols
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
Bit Commitment Using Pseudo-Randomness
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
On cheating in sealed-bid auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Social choice and preference protection: towards fully private mechanism design
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Towards a general theory of non-cooperative computation
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Randomized truthful auctions of digital goods are randomizations over truthful auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
(Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Privacy and communication complexity
SFCS '89 Proceedings of the 30th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
An implementation of the contract net protocol based on marginal cost calculations
AAAI'93 Proceedings of the eleventh national conference on Artificial intelligence
Complexity of mechanism design
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Efficient privacy-preserving protocols for multi-unit auctions
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
A rational approach to cryptographic protocols
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
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Mechanisms that aggregate the possibly conflicting preferences of individual agents are studied extensively in economics, operations research, and lately computer science. Perhaps surprisingly, the classic literature assumes participating agents to act selfishly, possibly untruthfully, if it is to their advantage, whereas the mechanism center is usually assumed to be honest and trustworthy. We argue that cryptography offers various concepts and building blocks to ensure the secure, i.e., correct and private, execution of mechanisms. We propose models with and without a center that guarantee correctness and preserve the privacy of preferences relying on diverse assumptions such as the trustworthiness of the center or the hardness of computation. The decentralized model in which agents jointly “emulate” a virtual mechanism center is particularly interesting for two reasons. For one, it provides privacy without relying on a trusted third-party. Second, it enables the provably correct execution of randomized mechanisms (which is not the case in the centralized model). We furthermore point out how untruthful and multi-step mechanisms can improve privacy. In particular, we show that the fully private emulation of a preference elicitor can result in unconditional privacy of a (non-empty) subset of preferences.