How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Secure Computation without Agreement
DISC '02 Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Distributed Computing
Robust Non-interactive Zero Knowledge
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Wallet Databases with Observers
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proofs of Partial Knowledge and Simplified Design of Witness Hiding Protocols
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Some Tractable Combinatorial Auctions
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Non-interactive Private Auctions
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Private Selective Payment Protocols
FC '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
On the Security of ElGamal Based Encryption
PKC '98 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Self-tallying Elections and Perfect Ballot Secrecy
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
M+1-st Price Auction Using Homomorphic Encryption
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
Social choice and preference protection: towards fully private mechanism design
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
(Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Combinatorial Auctions
How to generate and exchange secrets
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Secure combinatorial auctions by dynamic programming with polynomial secret sharing
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
A two-server, sealed-bid auction protocol
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
On correctness and privacy in distributed mechanisms
AMEC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms
On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
One-time encryption-key technique for the traditional DL-based encryption scheme with anonymity
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Auctions in do-not-track compliant internet advertising
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Bidder-anonymous English auction protocol based on revocable ring signature
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
A practical implementation of secure auctions based on multiparty integer computation
FC'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
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The purpose of multi-unit auctions is to allocate identical units of a single type of good to multiple agents. Besides well-known applications like the selling of treasury bills, electrical power, or spectrum licenses, multi-unit auctions are also well-suited for allocating CPU time slots or network bandwidth in computational multiagent systems. A crucial problem in sealed-bid auctions is the lack of trust bidders might have in the auctioneer. For one, bidders might doubt the correctness of the auction outcome. Secondly, they are reluctant to reveal their private valuations to the auctioneer since these valuations are often based on sensitive information. We propose privacy-preserving protocols that allow bidders to jointly compute the auction outcome without the help of third parties. All three common types of multi-unit auctions (uniform-price, discriminatory, and generalized Vickrey auctions) are considered for the case of marginal decreasing valuation functions. Our protocols are based on distributed homomorphic encryption and can be executed in a small constant number of rounds in the random oracle model. Security merely relies on computational intractability (the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption). In particular, no subset of (computationally bounded) colluding participants is capable of uncovering private information.