STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: a configurable auction server for human and software agents
AGENTS '98 Proceedings of the second international conference on Autonomous agents
AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An efficient approximate algorithm for winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Communications of the ACM
Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Efficient Sealed-Bid Auction Using Hash Chain
ICISC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Sealed Bid Mulit-object Auctions with Necessary Bundles and Its Application to Spectrum Auctions
PRIMA 2001 Proceedings of the 4th Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, Intelligent Agents: Specification, Modeling, and Applications
Some Tractable Combinatorial Auctions
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Non-interactive Private Auctions
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Efficient Sealed-Bid Auctions for Massive Numbers of Bidders with Lump Comparison
ISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information Security
M+1-st Price Auction Using Homomorphic Encryption
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
Dynamic Programming
Electronic auctions with private bids
WOEC'98 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 3
Economic mechanism design for computerized agents
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
How to generate and exchange secrets
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'99 Proceedings of the 16th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: optimal and approximate approaches
IJCAI'99 Proceedings of the 16th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
CABOB: a fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Secure Distributed Constraint Satisfaction: Reaching Agreement without Revealing Private Information
CP '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming
Receipt-Free Sealed-Bid Auction
ISC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Security
Protocol/Mechanism Design for Cooperation/Competition
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Secure distributed constraint satisfaction: reaching agreement without revealing private information
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue: Distributed constraint satisfaction
Exchange market for complex commodities: search for optimal matches
Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence
Secure distributed constraint satisfaction: reaching agreement without revealing private information
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue: Distributed constraint satisfaction
Longest common subsequence as private search
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Unconditionally secure first-price auction protocols using a multicomponent commitment scheme
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Efficient privacy-preserving protocols for multi-unit auctions
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Secure multi-attribute procurement auction
WISA'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Security Applications
Development and evaluation of a secure, privacy preserving combinatorial auction
AISC '11 Proceedings of the Ninth Australasian Information Security Conference - Volume 116
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Combinatorial auctions have recently attracted the interests of many researchers due to their promising applications such as the spectrum auctions recently held by the FCC. In a combinatorial auction, multiple items with interdependent values are sold simultaneously and bidders are allowed to bid on any combination of items. This paper presents a method for implementing several secure combinatorial auction protocols based on our newly developed secure dynamic programming protocol. Dynamic programming is a very effective, widely used technique for tackling various combinatorial optimization problems, including several types of combinatorial auctions. Our secure dynamic programming protocol utilizes secret sharing techniques and can obtain the optimal solution of a combinatorial optimization problem, i.e., result of a combinatorial auction, without revealing the inputs of the problem, i.e., bidding prices. We discuss the application of the method to several combinatorial auctions, i.e., multiple-unit single-item auctions, linear-goods auctions, and general combinatorial auctions.