Oblivious transfer and polynomial evaluation
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proving Without Knowing: On Oblivious, Agnostic and Blindolded Provers
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
PayWord and MicroMint: Two Simple Micropayment Schemes
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Security Protocols
An Auction Protocol Which Hides Bids of Losers
PKC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
The Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem
ANTS-III Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Algorithmic Number Theory
Number-theoretic constructions of efficient pseudo-random functions
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
How to generate and exchange secrets
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Robust, Privacy Protecting and Publicly Verifiable Sealed-Bid Auction
ICICS '02 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Receipt-Free Sealed-Bid Auction
ISC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Security
M+1-st Price Auction Using Homomorphic Encryption
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
Five sealed-bid auction models
ACSW Frontiers '03 Proceedings of the Australasian information security workshop conference on ACSW frontiers 2003 - Volume 21
Publicly Verifiable Auctions with Minimal Leakage
COMPSAC '04 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference - Volume 01
MoRVAM: A reverse Vickrey auction system for mobile commerce
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Bidder-anonymous English auction scheme with privacy and public verifiability
Journal of Systems and Software
Efficient Vote Validity Check in Homomorphic Electronic Voting
Information Security and Cryptology --- ICISC 2008
A new reverse auction agent system for m-commerce using mobile agents
Computer Standards & Interfaces
A secure reverse Vickrey auction scheme with bid privacy
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Efficient bid validity check in ElGamal-based sealed-bid e-auction
ISPEC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Information security practice and experience
Secure combinatorial auctions by dynamic programming with polynomial secret sharing
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
A second-price sealed-bid auction with verifiable discriminant of ρo-th root
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Non-interactive auction scheme with strong privacy
ICISC'02 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Efficiency improvement of homomorphic e-auction
TrustBus'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Trust, privacy and security in digital business
Practicalization of a range test and its application to e-auction
EuroPKI'09 Proceedings of the 6th European conference on Public key infrastructures, services and applications
Batch range proof for practical small ranges
AFRICACRYPT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Cryptology in Africa
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A newsc heme for electronic sealed-bid auctions that preserves losing bids is presented. By this scheme, the computational complexity of the opening phase can be reduced to O(log l); previous works required O(N驴l) or O(N驴log l) where the number of bidders is N and the range of bids is l. The proposed scheme has two technical points. One is that computational complexity is independent of the number of bidders. The other is a newefficien t value-comparing method. These techniques allowour auction scheme to be more than five hundred times faster than previous schemes. Furthermore, our auction scheme can be eleven million times faster than previous schemes if it is assured that auctioneers do not conspire.