A second-price sealed-bid auction with verifiable discriminant of ρo-th root

  • Authors:
  • Kazumasa Omote;Atsuko Miyaji

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Information Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Ishikawa, Japan;School of Information Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Ishikawa, Japan

  • Venue:
  • FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

A second-price sealed-bid auction is that a bidder who offers the highest price gets a good in the second highest price. This style of auction solves the problems of both an English auction and a first-price sealed-bid auction. An electronic first-price sealed-bid auction cannot directly be applied to a second-price sealed-bid auction which keeps the highest bid secret. We propose the verifiable discriminant function of the po-th root. Our auction scheme satisfies public verifiability of auction results, and also does not have a single entity who knows the highest bid value even after an auction. Furthermore the bidding cost of our scheme is lower than that of the previous one.