Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue on economics of electronic commerce
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Wallet Databases with Observers
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proofs of Partial Knowledge and Simplified Design of Witness Hiding Protocols
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proving Without Knowing: On Oblivious, Agnostic and Blindolded Provers
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Statistical Zero Knowledge Protocols to Prove Modular Polynomial Relations
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
1-out-of-n Signatures from a Variety of Keys
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Efficient Sealed-Bid Auctions for Massive Numbers of Bidders with Lump Comparison
ISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information Security
An Auction Protocol Which Hides Bids of Losers
PKC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
M+1-st Price Auction Using Homomorphic Encryption
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
Distributed Auction Servers Resolving Winner and Winning Bid without Revealing Privacy of Bids
ICPADS '00 Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems: Workshops
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Publicly verifiable sealed electronic auctions are proposed. The schemes enjoy the following advantages. They require no special trusted parties. After bid opening phase, only the winning price is revealed and the relation of other bidding amounts keep unknown. The winning price is publicly verifiable. Our scheme supports the first-price auction, Vickrey auction and (M+1)st-price auction. Finally, the first-price auction is very efficient and the generic (M+1)st-price auction is applicable when a high standard of security is required.