Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
SAM: A Flexible and Secure Auction Architecture Using Trusted Hardware
IPDPS '01 Proceedings of the 15th International Parallel & Distributed Processing Symposium
Robust, Privacy Protecting and Publicly Verifiable Sealed-Bid Auction
ICICS '02 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
ESORICS '02 Proceedings of the 7th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Mix and Match: Secure Function Evaluation via Ciphertexts
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Non-interactive Private Auctions
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
The design and implementation of a secure auction service
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Resource Management Using Untrusted Auctioneers in a Grid Economy
E-SCIENCE '06 Proceedings of the Second IEEE International Conference on e-Science and Grid Computing
Electronic auctions with private bids
WOEC'98 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 3
Secure combinatorial auctions by dynamic programming with polynomial secret sharing
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
A two-server, sealed-bid auction protocol
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
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The use of electronic auctions as a means of trading goods has increased year after year. eBay has gone from half a million registered users in 1998 to 88 million today. Businesses have also shown interest in using auctions. However, the traditional single good auction as used by eBay lacks the required ability to express dependencies between goods in complex procurement auctions leading to risky bidding strategies and sub optimal allocations. The use of combinatorial auctions, where bidders can place bids on combinations of goods, allows bidders to take advantage of any dependencies and auctioneers to generate optimal allocations of goods. In this paper we introduce a new algorithm for creating a combinatorial auction circuit that can be used to compute the result of a combinatorial auction by any garbled circuit auction protocol. In an electronic auction bids from competing parties are commercially sensitive information as bidders will not want their competitors finding out the value they place on a given item. Therefore, there has been considerable research into auction protocols that protect knowledge of all bids except the winning bid from everyone, including the auctioneer. The Garbled Circuit (GC) protocol as described by Naor, Pinkas and Sumner is an example of such an auction. However, it has only been used to provide privacy for single good auctions rather than combinatorial auctions and has been considered impractical for realistically sized auctions due to the protocol's communication overheads. Using our algorithm for creating combinatorial auction circuits, the GC protocol can conduct combinatorial auction while keeping losing bid values secret. We have also conducted performance measurements on both the computation and communication overhead of the GC protocol using our combinatorial auction circuit. These experiments show that the communication overhead is low enough to allow its use for realistically sized auctions (6MB for an auction with 3 goods, a maximum price of 16, and 100 bidders).