An architecture for virtual organization (VO)-based effective peering of content delivery networks
Proceedings of the second workshop on Use of P2P, GRID and agents for the development of content networks
A new resource selection approach based on reputation driven Min-min algorithm in the grid economy
CHINA HPC '07 Proceedings of the 2007 Asian technology information program's (ATIP's) 3rd workshop on High performance computing in China: solution approaches to impediments for high performance computing
Grid resource allocation: allocation mechanisms and utilisation patterns
AusGrid '08 Proceedings of the sixth Australasian workshop on Grid computing and e-research - Volume 82
A framework of sensor-cloud integration opportunities and challenges
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication
Architecture and performance models for QoS-driven effective peering of content delivery networks
Multiagent and Grid Systems - Content management and delivery through P2P-based content networks
A comparison of economic resource allocation mechanisms in grids of e-waste computers
SMO'09 Proceedings of the 9th WSEAS international conference on Simulation, modelling and optimization
Auction resource allocation mechanisms in grids of heterogeneous computers
WSEAS Transactions on Computers
A grid resource allocation mechanism for heterogeneous e-waste computers
AusGrid '09 Proceedings of the Seventh Australasian Symposium on Grid Computing and e-Research - Volume 99
Development and evaluation of a secure, privacy preserving combinatorial auction
AISC '11 Proceedings of the Ninth Australasian Information Security Conference - Volume 116
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The CORA (Coallocative, Oversubscribing Resource Allocation) architecture is an auction based resource reservation system that makes combinatorial allocations of resources to clients. The focus of this paper is on the use of cryptographic tools in CORA to remove the need for trust in the resource auctioneer. One of the nice properties of this approach is that the auctioneers can be drawn from an arbitrary pool of untrusted peers, without the need to establish pre-existing trust or restrict the role of auctioneer to a trusted system service. This approach results in more flexibility in the design of large economic systems, with the potential for wide distribution of load amongst many auctioneers. In addition, only the winners of the auction and the prices they pay are revealed while all other bid values are kept secret. It is our belief that future growth or commercialisation of large scale Grid systems requires the provision of such mechanisms to share the wide pool of Grid brokered resources such as computers, software, licences and peripherals amongst many users and organisations. This paper encapsulates an overview of our design, our experiences of implementing two different secure auction protocols and the performances that we have achieved.