Distributed games: from mechanisms to protocols
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
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SOFSEM '00 Proceedings of the 27th Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Informatics
A non-parametric estimator for setting reservation prices in procurement auctions
Information Technology and Management
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IJCAI'99 Proceedings of the 16th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Bundle design in robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
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Secure combinatorial auctions by dynamic programming with polynomial secret sharing
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The Internet offers new challenges to the fields of economics and artificial intelligence. This paper addresses several basic problems inspired by the adaptation of economic mechanisms, and auctions in particular, to the Internet. Computational environments such as the Internet offer a high degree of flexibility in auctions'rules. This makes the study of optimal auctions especially interesting in such environments. Although the problem of optimal auctions has received a lot of attention in economics, only partial solutions are supplied in the existing literature. We present least upper bounds (l.u.b) Rn on the revenue obtained by a seller in any auction with n participants. Our bounds imply that if the number of participants is large then the revenue obtained by standard auctions (e.g., English auctions) approach the theoretical bound. Our results heavily rely on the risk-aversion assumption made in the economics literature. We further show that without this assumption, the seller's revenue (for a fixed number of participants) may significantly exceed the upper bound.