Do the right thing: studies in limited rationality
Do the right thing: studies in limited rationality
Spawn: A Distributed Computational Economy
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Deliberation scheduling for problem solving in time-constrained environments
Artificial Intelligence
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Artificial intelligence: a modern approach
Artificial intelligence: a modern approach
Reasoning about knowledge
Public access to the Internet
Optimal composition of real-time systems
Artificial Intelligence
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
A Bayesian approach to relevance in game playing
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on relevance
AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Time-quality tradeoffs in reallocative negotiation with combinatorial contract types
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
eMediator: a next generation electronic commerce server
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
eMediator: a next generation electronic commerce server
AGENTS '00 Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Autonomous agents
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Nomad: Mobile Agent System for an Internet-Based Auction House
IEEE Internet Computing
Unenforced E-Commerce Transactions
IEEE Internet Computing
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Speeding Up Ascending-Bid Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Sequential Auctions for the Allocation of Resources with Complementarities
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Deliberation in Equilibrium: Bargaining in Computationally Complex Problems
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Algorithms for Optimizing Leveled Commitment Contracts
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Reasoning About Others: Representing and Processing Infinite Belief Hierarchies
ICMAS '00 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems (ICMAS-2000)
Utility-Based Termination of Anytime Algorithms
Utility-Based Termination of Anytime Algorithms
Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents
Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents
Economic mechanism design for computerized agents
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
Equilibrium analysis of the possibilities of unenforced exchange in multiagent systems
IJCAI'95 Proceedings of the 14th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Advantages of a leveled commitment contracting protocol
AAAI'96 Proceedings of the thirteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Mechanism design with incomplete languages
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Bargaining with limited computation: deliberation equilibrium
Artificial Intelligence
An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally limited agents
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Markets without Makers - A Framework for Decentralized Economic Coordination in Multiagent Systems
WELCOM '01 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Electronic Commerce
Differential -Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
BOB: improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations
Artificial Intelligence
Miscomputing ratio: social cost of selfish computing
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Experiments on Deliberation Equilibria in Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
(Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Mechanism design and deliberative agents
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Reducing costly information acquisition in auctions
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
Management Science
Bidding Behavior in On-line Auctions: An Examination of the eBay Pokemon Card Market
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Expressive commerce and its application to sourcing
IAAI'06 Proceedings of the 18th conference on Innovative applications of artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Valuation uncertainty and imperfect introspection in second-price auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Chain: a dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Automated design of multistage mechanisms
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Cooperative ARQ via auction-based spectrum leasing
IEEE Transactions on Communications
Dynamic Auction Mechanism for Cloud Resource Allocation
CCGRID '10 Proceedings of the 2010 10th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Cluster, Cloud and Grid Computing
Expressive markets for donating to charities
Artificial Intelligence
Inter-domain pricing: challenges and possible approaches
International Journal of Network Management
Mechanism design with approximate valuations
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
A vickrey-type multi-attribute auction model
ICMLC'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Advances in Machine Learning and Cybernetics
An approach to detecting shill-biddable allocations in combinatorial auctions
DEECS'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Data Engineering Issues in E-Commerce and Services
Designing auctions for deliberative agents
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
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The Vickrey auction has been widely advocated for multiagent systems. This protocol has several limitations (lower revenue than with alternative protocols, lying in non-private-value auctions, bidder collusion, lying auctioneers, undesirable revelations of sensitive information), and they are reviewed so as to guide practitioners in deciding when to use it. The special characteristics of Internet auctions are also discussed (third-party auction servers, cryptography, how proxy agents relate to the revelation principle and fail to promote truth telling), as well as several limitations of the protocol that stem from considerations of computational complexity (inefficient allocation and lying in sequential auctions of interrelated items, untruthful bidding under valuation uncertainty, counterspeculation to make deliberation-control or information-gathering decisions). Finally, methods for determining winners and prices in combinatorial "second-price" auctions are treated, together with the implications for truth dominance.