Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bargaining with limited computation: deliberation equilibrium
Artificial Intelligence
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Mechanism Design for Resource Bounded Agents
ICMAS '00 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems (ICMAS-2000)
Computational criticisms of the revelation principle
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Experiments on Deliberation Equilibria in Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Issues in computational Vickrey auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce - Special issue: Intelligent agents for electronic commerce
Resource allocation among agents with preferences induced by factored MDPs
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Reducing costly information acquisition in auctions
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Combinatorial resource scheduling for multiagent MDPs
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Valuation uncertainty and imperfect introspection in second-price auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Efficient metadeliberation auctions
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Mechanism design for dynamic settings
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
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The central mechanism design problem is to develop incentives for agents to truthfully reveal their preferences over different outcomes, so that the system-wide outcome chosen by the mechanism appropriately reflects these preferences. However, in many settings, agents' do not know their actual preferences a priori. Instead, an agent may need to compute or gather information to determine whether they prefer one possible outcome over another. Due to time constraints or the cost of acquiring information, agents must be deliberative in that they need to carefully decide how to allocate their computational or information gathering resources when determining their preferences. In this paper we study the problem of designing mechanisms explicitly for deliberative agents. We propose a set of intuitive properties which we argue are desirable in deliberative-agent settings. We show that these properties are mutually incompatible, and that many approaches to mechanism design are not robust against undesirable behavior from deliberative agents.