The multi-armed bandit problem: decomposition and computation
Mathematics of Operations Research
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Planning, learning and coordination in multiagent decision processes
TARK '96 Proceedings of the 6th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Mechanism design and deliberative agents
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Reducing costly information acquisition in auctions
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Mechanism design for dynamic settings
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Mechanism design for dynamic environments: online double auctions
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
Efficient crowdsourcing contests
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
On revenue maximization for agents with costly information acquisition: extended abstract
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
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Imagine a resource allocation scenario in which the interested parties can, at a cost, individually research ways of using the resource to be allocated, potentially increasing the value they would achieve from obtaining it. Each agent has a private model of its research process and obtains a private realization of its improvement in value, if any. From a social perspective it is optimal to coordinate research in a way that strikes the right tradeoff between value and cost, ultimately allocating the resource to one party- thus this is a problem of multi-agent metadeliberation. We provide a reduction of computing the optimal deliberation-allocation policy to computing Gittins indices in multi-anned bandit worlds, and apply a modification of the dynamic-VCG mechanism to yield truthful participation in an ex post equilibrium. Our mechanism achieves equilibrium implementation ofthe optimal policy even when agents have the capacity to deliberate about other agents' valuations, and thus addresses the problem of strategic deliberation.