Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Games with a Purpose
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Designing incentives for online question and answer forums
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Efficient metadeliberation auctions
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Incentivizing high-quality user-generated content
Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web
A game-theoretic analysis of rank-order mechanisms for user-generated content
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal crowdsourcing contests
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
A game-theoretic analysis of the ESP game
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Inaugural Issue
Quality-control mechanism utilizing worker's confidence for crowdsourced tasks
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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A principal seeks production of a good within a limited timeframe with a hard deadline, after which any good procured has no value. There is inherent uncertainty in the production process, which in light of the deadline may warrant simultaneous production of multiple goods by multiple producers despite there being no marginal value for extra goods beyond the maximum quality good produced. This motivates a crowdsourcing model of procurement. We address efficient execution of such procurement from a social planner's perspective, taking account of and optimally balancing the value to the principal with the costs to producers (modeled as effort expenditure) while, crucially, contending with self-interest on the part of all players. A solution to this problem involves both an algorithmic aspect that determines an optimal effort level for each producer given the principal's value, and also an incentive mechanism that achieves equilibrium implementation of the socially optimal policy despite the principal privately observing his value, producers privately observing their skill levels and effort expenditure, and all acting selfishly to maximize their own individual welfare. In contrast to popular "winner take all" contests, the efficient mechanism we propose involves a payment to every producer that expends non-zero effort in the efficient policy.