Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
MDPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
MDPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Realising Common Knowledge Assumptions in Agent Auctions
IAT '06 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Generalized trade reduction mechanisms
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Mechanism design for sensor fusion: tactical networks as a foil for ultra large scale systems
Proceedings of the 2nd international workshop on Ultra-large-scale software-intensive systems
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Efficiency and redistribution in dynamic mechanism design
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions
CEEMAS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international Central and Eastern European conference on Multi-Agent Systems and Applications V
Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms
Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies VI
Optimal strategies in sequential bidding
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Sequential partition mechanism for strongly budget-balanced redistribution
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Handling self-interest in groups, with minimal cost
AAAI'06 proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
M-DPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How pervasive is the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility?
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Sequential Pivotal Mechanisms for Public Project Problems
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Sequential Bidding in the Bailey-Cavallo Mechanism
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Artificial Intelligence
Quantifying the strategyproofness of mechanisms via metrics on payoff distributions
UAI '09 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Mobicent: a credit-based incentive system for disruption tolerant network
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Efficient mechanisms with small subsidies
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Algorithms and theory of computation handbook
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Expressive markets for donating to charities
Artificial Intelligence
Mechanism design for dynamic settings
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Inter-domain pricing: challenges and possible approaches
International Journal of Network Management
Redistribution mechanisms for assignment of heterogeneous objects
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A revenue sharing mechanism for federated search and advertising
Proceedings of the 21st international conference companion on World Wide Web
Budget-balanced and nearly efficient randomized mechanisms: public goods and beyond
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Efficient crowdsourcing contests
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in heterogeneous-item auctions with unit demand
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Inaugural Issue
Redistribution of VCG payments in public project problems
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Generalized Partition Mechanism: Framework for Combining Multiple Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
WI-IAT '12 Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Redistribution in online mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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Mechanisms for coordinating group decision-making among self-interested agents often employ a trusted center, capable of enforcing the prescribed outcome. Typically such mechanisms, including the ubiquitous Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG), require significant transfer payments from agents to the center. While this is sought after in some settings, it is often an unwanted cost of implementation. We propose a modification of the VCG framework that---by using domain information regarding agent valuation spaces---is often able to achieve redistribution of much of the required transfer payments back among the agents, thus coming closer to budget-balance. The proposed mechanism is strategyproof, ex post individual rational, no-deficit, and leads to an efficient outcome; we prove that among all mechanisms with these qualities and an anonymity property it is optimally balanced, in that no mechanism ever yields greater payoff to the agents. We provide a general characterization of when strategyproof redistribution is possible, and demonstrate specifically that substantial redistribution can be achieved in allocation problems.