Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Artificial Intelligence
Redistribution mechanisms for assignment of heterogeneous objects
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A budget-balanced, incentive-compatible scheme for social choice
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Budget-balanced and nearly efficient randomized mechanisms: public goods and beyond
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in heterogeneous-item auctions with unit demand
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
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The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCG mechanism (also known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Unfortunately, the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget balanced. That is, under such mechanisms, payments may flow into or out of the system of the agents, resulting in deficits or reduced utilities for the agents. We consider the following problem: within the family of Groves mechanisms, we want to identify mechanisms that give the agents the highest utilities, under the constraint that these mechanisms must never incur deficits. We adopt a prior-free approach. We introduce two general measures for comparing mechanisms in prior-free settings. We say that a non-deficit Groves mechanism M individually dominates another non-deficit Groves mechanism M' if for every type profile, every agent's utility under M is no less than that under M', and this holds with strict inequality for at least one type profile and one agent. We say that a non-deficit Groves mechanism M collectively dominates another non-deficit Groves mechanism M' if for every type profile, the agents' total utility under M is no less than that under M', and this holds with strict inequality for at least one type profile. The above definitions induce two partial orders on non-deficit Groves mechanisms. We study the maximal elements corresponding to these two partial orders, which we call the individually undominated mechanisms and the collectively undominated mechanisms, respectively.