Budget-balanced and nearly efficient randomized mechanisms: public goods and beyond

Authors:
Mingyu Guo;Victor Naroditskiy;Vincent Conitzer;Amy Greenwald;Nicholas R. Jennings
Affiliations:
Computer Science Department, University of Liverpool, UK;School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, UK;Department of Computer Science, Duke University;Department of Computer Science, Brown University;School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, UK
Venue:
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2011

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Abstract

Many scenarios where participants hold private information require payments to encourage truthful revelation. Some of these scenarios have no natural residual claimant who would absorb the budget surplus or cover the deficit. Faltings [7] proposed the idea of excluding one agent uniformly at random and making him the residual claimant. Based on this idea, we propose two classes of public good mechanisms and derive optimal ones within each class: Faltings' mechanism is optimal in one of the classes. We then move on to general mechanism design settings, where we prove guarantees on the social welfare achieved by Faltings' mechanism. Finally, we analyze a modification of the mechanism where budget balance is achieved without designating any agent as the residual claimant.