Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism Design via Machine Learning
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
A budget-balanced, incentive-compatible scheme for social choice
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Sequential partition mechanism for strongly budget-balanced redistribution
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Sequential Bidding in the Bailey-Cavallo Mechanism
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Artificial Intelligence
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Redistribution mechanisms for assignment of heterogeneous objects
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Budget-balanced and nearly efficient randomized mechanisms: public goods and beyond
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Inaugural Issue
Generalized Partition Mechanism: Framework for Combining Multiple Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
WI-IAT '12 Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Redistribution in online mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mechanism is not strongly budget balanced: in general, value flows out of the system of agents in the form of VCG payments, which reduces the agents' utilities. In many settings, the objective is to maximize the sum of the agents' utilities (taking payments into account). For this purpose, several VCG redistribution mechanisms have been proposed that redistribute a large fraction of the VCG payments back to the agents, in a way that maintains strategy-proofness and the non-deficit property. Unfortunately, sometimes even the best VCG redistribution mechanism fails to redistribute a substantial fraction of the VCG payments. This results in a low total utility for the agents, even though the items are allocated efficiently. In this paper, we study strategy-proof allocation mechanisms that do not always allocate the items efficiently. It turns out that by allocating inefficiently, more payment can sometimes be redistributed, so that the net effect is an increase in the sum of the agents' utilities. Our objective is to design mechanisms that are competitive with the omnipotent perfect allocation in terms of the agents' total utility. We define linear allocation mechanisms. We propose an optimization model for simultaneously finding an allocation mechanism and a payment redistribution rule which together are optimal, given that the allocation mechanism is required to be either one of, or a mixture of, a finite set of specified linear allocation mechanisms. Finally, we propose several specific (linear) mechanisms that are based on burning items, excluding agents, and (most generally) partitioning the items and agents into groups. We show or conjecture that these mechanisms are optimal among various classes of mechanisms.