Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
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AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
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AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments
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Optimal mechanism design and money burning
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Efficiency and redistribution in dynamic mechanism design
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
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Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
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WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Sequential Pivotal Mechanisms for Public Project Problems
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
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We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [2] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions and for public project problems, and in each case social welfare undominated mechanisms were identified. One way to improve upon these optimality results is by allowing the players to move sequentially. With this in mind, we study here a sequential version of the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism, a natural mechanism that was proved to be welfare undominated in the simultaneous setting by [2]. Because of the absence of dominant strategies in the sequential setting, we focus on a weaker concept of an optimal strategy. We proceed by introducing natural optimal strategies and show that among all optimal strategies, the one we introduce generates maximal social welfare. Finally, we show that the proposed strategies form a safety level equilibrium and within the class of optimal strategies they also form a Pareto optimal ex-post equilibrium.