On social laws for artificial agent societies: off-line design
Artificial Intelligence - Special volume on computational research on interaction and agency, part 2
Online computation and competitive analysis
Online computation and competitive analysis
Population uncertainty and Poisson games
International Journal of Game Theory
Regret minimizing equilibria and mechanisms for games with strict type uncertainty
UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Learning equilibrium as a generalization of learning to optimize
Artificial Intelligence
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Routing games with an unknown set of active players
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Epistemic logic and explicit knowledge in distributed programming
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Window-Games between TCP Flows
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Learning equilibria in repeated congestion games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Two-terminal routing games with unknown active players
Artificial Intelligence
Learning equilibrium in resource selection games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Sequential Bidding in the Bailey-Cavallo Mechanism
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Wardrop Equilibria with Risk-Averse Users
Transportation Science
Window-games between TCP flows
Theoretical Computer Science
Strategy elimination in games with interaction structures
LORI'09 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Logic, rationality and interaction
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Two-sided matching with partial information
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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In the context of pre-Bayesian games we analyze resource selection games with unknown number of players. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric safety-level equilibrium in such games and show that in a game with strictly increasing linear cost functions every player benefits from the common ignorance about the number of players. In order to perform the analysis we define safety-level equilibrium for pre-Bayesian games, and prove that it exists in a compact-continuous-concave setup; in particular it exists in a finite setup.