Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Complexity of mechanism design
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
A budget-balanced, incentive-compatible scheme for social choice
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Efficiency and redistribution in dynamic mechanism design
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Sequential partition mechanism for strongly budget-balanced redistribution
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sequential Bidding in the Bailey-Cavallo Mechanism
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Almost budget-balanced mechanisms for allocation of divisible resources
Allerton'09 Proceedings of the 47th annual Allerton conference on Communication, control, and computing
Inter-domain pricing: challenges and possible approaches
International Journal of Network Management
Redistribution mechanisms for assignment of heterogeneous objects
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the allocation of multiple resources to multiple agents. If agents are self-interested, they will lie about their valuations for the resources if they perceive this to be in their interest. The well-known VCG mechanism allocates the items efficiently, is incentive compatible (agents have no incentive to lie), and never runs a deficit. Nevertheless, the agents may have to make large payments to a party outside the system of agents, leading to decreased utility for the agents. Recent work has investigated the possibility of redistributing some of the payments back to the agents, without violating the other desirable properties of the VCG mechanism. We study multi-unit auctions with unit demand, for which previously a mechanism has been found that maximizes the worst-case redistribution percentage. In contrast, we assume that a prior distribution over the agents' valuations is available, and try to maximize the expected total redistribution. We analytically solve for a mechanism that is optimal among linear redistribution mechanisms. The optimal linear mechanism is asymptotically optimal. We also propose discretization redistribution mechanisms. We show how to automatically solve for the optimal discretization redistribution mechanism for a given discretization step size, and show that the resulting mechanisms converge to optimality as the step size goes to zero. We also present experimental results showing that for auctions with many bidders, the optimal linear redistribution mechanism redistributes almost everything, whereas for auctions with few bidders, we can solve for the optimal discretization redistribution mechanism with a very small step size.