Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue on economics of electronic commerce
Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Electronic Commerce Research
An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
An average-case budget-non-negative double auction protocol
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
A New Approach to the Design of Electronic Exchanges
EC-WEB '02 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on E-Commerce and Web Technologies
Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Trade of a problem-solving task
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A new bidding framework for combinatorial e-auctions
Computers and Operations Research
Negotiation-range mechanisms: exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Auction based resource negotiation in NOMAD
ACSC '05 Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Australasian conference on Computer Science - Volume 38
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
The Landscape of Electronic Market Design
Management Science
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combinatorial exchanges for coordinating grid services
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Grid resource allocation: allocation mechanisms and utilisation patterns
AusGrid '08 Proceedings of the sixth Australasian workshop on Grid computing and e-research - Volume 82
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Bridging the Adoption Gap-Developing a Roadmap for Trading in Grids
Electronic Markets
On the Approximability of Combinatorial Exchange Problems
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Handling self-interest in groups, with minimal cost
AAAI'06 proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Expressive negotiation in settings with externalities
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
An expressive auction design for online display advertising
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Decentralized supply chain formation: a market protocol and competitive equilibrium analysis
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Concurrent auctions across the supply chain
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Resource allocation among agents with MDP-induced preferences
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Chain: a dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
M-DPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
ICE: an expressive iterative combinatorial exchange
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
A Practical Combinatorial Clock Exchange for Spectrum Licenses
Decision Analysis
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Artificial Intelligence
Combinatorial Coalition Formation for multi-item group-buying with heterogeneous customers
Decision Support Systems
CATNETS - open market approaches for self-organizing grid resource allocation
GECON'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Grid economics and business models
Quantifying the strategyproofness of mechanisms via metrics on payoff distributions
UAI '09 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
A multidimensional procurement auction for trading composite services
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
An approach to vickrey-based resource allocation in the presence of monopolistic sellers
AusGrid '09 Proceedings of the Seventh Australasian Symposium on Grid Computing and e-Research - Volume 99
Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
A public procurement combinatorial auction mechanism with quality assignment
Decision Support Systems
Inter-domain pricing: challenges and possible approaches
International Journal of Network Management
Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Truthful auction for cooperative communications
MobiHoc '11 Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
GPC'06 Proceedings of the First international conference on Advances in Grid and Pervasive Computing
A budget-balanced, incentive-compatible scheme for social choice
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
Operations Research
Matching "versus" mechanism design
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
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Generalized Vickrey mechanisms have received wide attention in the literature because they are efficient and strategy-proof, i.e. truthful bidding is optimal whatever the bids of other agents. However it is well-known that it is impossible for an exchange, with multiple buyers and sellers, to be efficient and budget-balanced, even putting strategy-proofness to one side. A market-maker in an efficient exchange must make more payments than it collects. We enforce budget-balance as a hard constraint, and explore payment rules to distribute surplus after an exchange clears to minimize distance to Vickrey payments. Different rules lead to different levels of truth-revelation and efficiency. Experimental and theoretical analysis suggest a simple Threshold scheme, which gives surplus to agents with payments further than a certain threshold value from their Vickrey payments. The scheme appears able to exploit agent uncertainty about bids from other agents to reduce manipulation and boost allocative efficiency in comparison with other simple rules.