Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Ranking systems: the PageRank axioms
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Empirical mechanism design: methods, with application to a supply-chain scenario
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Multi-agent coordination using local search
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Complexity of mechanism design
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible feedback payments
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An ironing-based approach to adaptive online mechanism design in single-valued domains
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Mechanisms for making crowds truthful
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Evolutionary mechanism design: a review
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
A grey-box approach to automated mechanism design
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
A grey-box approach to automated mechanism design
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
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Mechanism design has traditionally focused almost exclusively on the design of truthful mechanisms. There are several drawbacks to this: 1. in certain settings (e.g. voting settings), no desirable strategy proof mechanisms exist; 2. truthful mechanisms are unable to take advantage of the fact that computationally bounded agents may not be able to find the best manipulation, and 3. when designing mechanisms automatically, this approach leads to constrained optimization problems for which current techniques do not scale to very large instances. In this paper, we suggest an entirely different approach: we start with a naïve (manipulable) mechanism, and incrementally make it more strategy proof over a sequence of iterations. We give examples of mechanisms that (variants of) our approach generate, including the VCG mechanism in general settings with payments, and the plurality-with-runoff voting rule. We also provide several basic algorithms for automatically executing our approach in general settings. Finally, we discuss how computationally hard it is for agents to find any remaining beneficial manipulation.