Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Bargaining with limited computation: deliberation equilibrium
Artificial Intelligence
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Graphical Models for Game Theory
UAI '01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Auction mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting
ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce
Expressive negotiation over donations to charities
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
More than the sum of its members: challenges for group recommender systems
Proceedings of the working conference on Advanced visual interfaces
An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Argumentation-based negotiation
The Knowledge Engineering Review
Regret minimizing equilibria and mechanisms for games with strict type uncertainty
UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Reputation systems: an axiomatic approach
UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Minimum payments that reward honest reputation feedback
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A Technique for Large Automated Mechanism Design Problems
IAT '06 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Reliable QoS monitoring based on client feedback
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web
Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible feedback payments
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Incentives for expressing opinions in online polls
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful opinions from the crowds
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Automated design of scoring rules by learning from examples
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 1
Multidimensional screening: online computation and limited information
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanisms for information elicitation
Artificial Intelligence
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
The learnability of voting rules
Artificial Intelligence
Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Searching for stable mechanisms: automated design for imperfect players
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Methods for boosting revenue in combinatorial auctions
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Mechanisms for partial information elicitation: the truth, but not the whole truth
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Robust mechanisms for information elicitation
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Automated online mechanism design and prophet inequalities
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Partial revelation automated mechanism design
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
A theory of expressiveness in mechanisms
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Axiomatic foundations for ranking systems
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Mechanisms for making crowds truthful
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Mechanism design with partial revelation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Automated design of multistage mechanisms
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Aggregation of autonomous Internetware entities
Proceedings of the First Asia-Pacific Symposium on Internetware
On the axiomatic foundations of ranking systems
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Eliciting honest reputation feedback in a Markov setting
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents
Communications of the ACM
Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Artificial Intelligence
On a linear framework for belief dynamics in multi-agent environments
CLIMA VII'06 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
The adaptive web
Quantifying the strategyproofness of mechanisms via metrics on payoff distributions
UAI '09 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Designing competitions between teams of individuals
Artificial Intelligence
Evolutionary mechanism design: a review
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Alternatives to truthfulness are hard to recognize
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Expressive markets for donating to charities
Artificial Intelligence
Welfare engineering in practice: on the variety of multiagent resource allocation problems
ESAW'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Engineering Societies in the Agents World
On correctness and privacy in distributed mechanisms
AMEC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms
Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Constrained automated mechanism design for infinite games of incomplete information
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Algorithms for strategyproof classification
Artificial Intelligence
Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Inaugural Issue
Two dimensional optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
IPCO'13 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Analysis and optimization of multi-dimensional percentile mechanisms
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that the agents are motivated to report their preferences truthfully and a (socially) desirable outcome is chosen. We propose an approach where a mechanism is automatically created for the preference aggregation setting at hand. This has several advantages, but the downside is that the mechanism design optimization problem needs to be solved anew each time. Focusing-on settings where side payments are not possible, we show that the mechanism design problem is NP-complete for deterministic mechanisms. This holds both for dominantstrategy implementation and for Bayes-Nash implementation. We then show that if we allow randomized mechanisms, the mechanism design problem becomes tractable. In other words, the coordinator can tackle the computational complexity introduced by its uncertainty the agents face additional uncertainty. This comes at no loss, and in some cases at a gain, in the (social) objective.