Do the right thing: studies in limited rationality
Do the right thing: studies in limited rationality
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on knowledge representation
Deliberation scheduling for problem solving in time-constrained environments
Artificial Intelligence
A survey of research in deliberative real-time artificial intelligence
Real-Time Systems
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
On complexity as bounded rationality (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiagent negotiation under time constraints
Artificial Intelligence
Optimal composition of real-time systems
Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
A Bayesian approach to relevance in game playing
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on relevance
Monitoring and control of anytime algorithms: a dynamic programming approach
Artificial Intelligence - special issue on computational tradeoffs under bounded resources
Principles and applications of continual computation
Artificial Intelligence - special issue on computational tradeoffs under bounded resources
Handbook of Computational Economics
Handbook of Computational Economics
Real-Time Problem-Solving with Contract Algorithms
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Issues in computational Vickrey auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce - Special issue: Intelligent agents for electronic commerce
An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally limited agents
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Bidders with hard valuation problems
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Guaranteeing Properties for E-commerce Systems
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Trade of a problem-solving task
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Miscomputing ratio: social cost of selfish computing
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Mechanism design and deliberative agents
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Playing games in many possible worlds
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A Classification Structure for Automated Negotiations
WI-IATW '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology
STRATUM: A METHODOLOGY FOR DESIGNING HEURISTIC AGENT NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES
Applied Artificial Intelligence
Searching for stable mechanisms: automated design for imperfect players
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Using performance profile trees to improve deliberation control
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Existence of multiagent equilibria with limited agents
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Definition and complexity of some basic metareasoning problems
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
A dialogue games framework for the operational semantics of logic agent-oriented languages
CLIMA'10 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
An empirical study of interest-based negotiation
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Complexity of mechanism design
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Negotiation among DDeLP agents
ArgMAS'04 Proceedings of the First international conference on Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems
Designing auctions for deliberative agents
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Negotiating flexible agreements by combining distributive and integrative negotiation
Intelligent Decision Technologies
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We develop a normative theory of interaction-negotiation in particular-among self-interested computationally limited agents where computational actions are game theoretically treated as part of an agent's strategy. We focus on a 2-agent setting where each agent has an intractable individual problem, and there is a potential gain from pooling the problems, giving rise to an intractable joint problem. At any time, an agent can compute to improve its solution to its own problem, its opponent's problem, or the joint problem. At a deadline the agents then decide whether to implement the joint solution, and if so, how to divide its value (or cost). We present a fully normative model for controlling anytime algorithms where each agent has statistical performance profiles which are optimally conditioned on the problem instance as well as on the path of results of the algorithm run so far. Using this model, we introduce a solution concept, which we call deliberation equilibrium. It is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game where deliberation actions are part of each agent's strategy. The equilibria differ based on whether the performance profiles are deterministic or stochastic, whether the deadline is known or not, and whether the proposer is known in advance or not. We present algorithms for finding the equilibria. Finally, we show that there exist instances of the deliberation-bargaining problem where no pure strategy equilibria exist and also instances where the unique equilibrium outcome is not Pareto efficient. Copyright 2001 Elsevier Science B.V.