An empirical study of interest-based negotiation

  • Authors:

  • Philippe Pasquier;Ramon Hollands;Iyad Rahwan;Frank Dignum;Liz Sonenberg

  • Affiliations:

  • School of Interactive Arts and Technology, Simon Fraser University, Surrey, Canada;Department of Information and Computing Science, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands;Masdar Institute of Science & Technology, Abu Dhabi, UAE and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA and University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK;Department of Information and Computing Science, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands;Department of Information Systems, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

  • Venue:
  • Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

While argumentation-based negotiation has been accepted as a promising alternative to game-theoretic or heuristic-based negotiation, no evidence has been provided to confirm this theoretical advantage. We propose a model of bilateral negotiation extending a simple monotonic concession protocol by allowing the agents to exchange information about their underlying interests and possible alternatives to achieve them during the negotiation. We present an empirical study that demonstrates (through simulation) the advantages of this interest-based negotiation approach over the more classic monotonic concession approach to negotiation.