Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Bargaining with limited computation: deliberation equilibrium
Artificial Intelligence
Making Rational Decisions Using Adaptive Utility Elicitation
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Toward case-based preference elicitation: similarity measures on preference structures
UAI'98 Proceedings of the Fourteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Logical Preference Representation and Combinatorial Vote
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
On the computational power of iterative auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Communication complexity of common voting rules
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Computing possible and necessary winners from incomplete partially-ordered preferences
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on ECAI 2006: 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence August 29 -- September 1, 2006, Riva del Garda, Italy
Computing slater rankings using similarities among candidates
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Improved bounds for computing Kemeny rankings
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The complexity of bribery in elections
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Computational aspects of mechanism design
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 4
Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The strategy-proofness landscape of merging
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Winner determination in sequential majority voting
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Automated design of multistage mechanisms
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Compiling the votes of a subelectorate
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Towards a dichotomy for the Possible Winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Aggregating value ranges: preference elicitation and truthfulness
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Practical voting rules with partial information
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
A generic coordination mechanism for lot-sizing in supply chains
Electronic Commerce Research
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: Complexity results
Artificial Intelligence
Group intention is social choice with commitment
COIN@AAMAS'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Coordination, organizations, institutions, and norms in agent systems
Vote elicitation with probabilistic preference models: empirical estimation and cost tradeoffs
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Some representation and computational issues in social choice
ECSQARU'05 Proceedings of the 8th European conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
Winner determination in voting trees with incomplete preferences and weighted votes
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
On correctness and privacy in distributed mechanisms
AMEC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Robust approximation and incremental elicitation in voting protocols
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence
Triadic consensus: a randomized algorithm for voting in a crowd
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Voting with partial information: what questions to ask?
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has received little attention here so far. In this setting, the agents may have different preferences that often must be aggregated using voting. This leads to interesting issues because what, if any, information should be elicited from an agent depends on what other agents have revealed about their preferences so far. In this paper we study effective elicitation, and its impediments, for the most common voting protocols. It turns out that in the Single Transferable Vote protocol, even knowing when to terminate elicitation is N P-complete, while this is easy for all the other protocols under study. Even for these protocols, determining how to elicit effectively is N P-complete, even with perfect suspicions about how the agents will vote. The exception is the Plurality protocol where such effective elicitation is easy. We also show that elicitation introduces additional opportunities for strategic manipulation by the voters. We demonstrate how to curtail the space of elicitation schemes so that no such additional strategic issues arise.