Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Towards a dichotomy for the Possible Winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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Voting is a way to aggregate individual voters' preferences. Traditionally a voter's preference is represented by a total order on the set of candidates. However, sometimes one may not have complete information about a voter's preference, and in this case, can only model a voter's preference as a partial order. Given this framework, there has been work on computing the possible and necessary winners of a (partial) profile. In this paper, we take a step further, look at sets of questions to ask in order to determine the outcome of such a partial profile. Specifically, we call a set of questions a deciding set for a candidate if the outcome of the vote for the candidate is determined no matter how the questions are answered by the voters, and a possible winning (losing) set if there is a way to answer these questions to make the candidate a winner (loser) of the vote. We discuss some interesting properties about these sets of queries, prove some complexity results about them under some well-known voting rules such as plurality and Borda, and consider their application in vote elicitation.