Introduction to Algorithms
Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Communication complexity of common voting rules
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Strongly decomposable voting rules on multiattribute domains
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Vote and aggregation in combinatorial domains with structured preferences
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Winner determination in sequential majority voting
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A multivariate complexity analysis of determining possible winners given incomplete votes
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Preference functions that score rankings and maximum likelihood estimation
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Manipulating Tournaments in Cup and Round Robin Competitions
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
The Complexity of Probabilistic Lobbying
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Manipulation of copeland elections
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Towards a dichotomy for the Possible Winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Taking the Final Step to a Full Dichotomy of the Possible Winner Problem in Pure Scoring Rules
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Possible winners when new alternatives join: new results coming up!
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Winner determination in voting trees with incomplete preferences and weighted votes
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Cloning in elections: finding the possible winners
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence
Campaigns for lazy voters: truncated ballots
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Possible and necessary winners of partial tournaments
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Optimal manipulation of voting rules
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Studies in computational aspects of voting: open problems of downey and fellows
The Multivariate Algorithmic Revolution and Beyond
The complexity of losing voters
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
On elections with robust winners
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Voting with partial information: what questions to ask?
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
A behavioral perspective on social choice
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Bribery in voting with CP-nets
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial orders instead. Then, given a voting rule, a profile of partial orders, and an alternative (candidate) c, two important questions arise: first, is it still possible for c to win, and second, is c guaranteed to win? These are the possible winner and necessary winner problems, respectively. Each of these two problems is further divided into two sub-problems: determining whether c is a unique winner (that is, c is the only winner), or determining whether c is a co-winner (that is, c is in the set of winners). We consider the setting where the number of alternatives is unbounded and the votes are unweighted. We completely characterize the complexity of possible/necessary winner problems for the following common voting rules: a class of positional scoring rules (including Borda), Copeland, maximin, Bucklin, ranked pairs, voting trees, and plurality with runoff.