Bribery in voting with CP-nets

Authors:
Nicholas Mattei;Maria Silvia Pini;Francesca Rossi;K. Brent Venable
Affiliations:
NICTA and University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia;Department of Information Engineering, University of Padova, Padova, Italy;Department of Mathematics, University of Padova, Padova, Italy;Department of Computer Science, Tulane University and IHMC, New Orleans, USA
Venue:
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2013

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Abstract

We investigate the computational complexity of finding optimal bribery schemes in voting domains where the candidate set is the Cartesian product of a set of variables and voters use CP-nets, an expressive and compact way to represent preferences. To do this, we generalize the traditional bribery problem to take into account several issues over which agents vote, and their inter-dependencies. We consider five voting rules, three kinds of bribery actions, and five cost schemes. For most of the combinations of these parameters, we find that bribery in this setting is computationally easy.