Logical Preference Representation and Combinatorial Vote
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
mCP nets: representing and reasoning with preferences of multiple agents
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On graphical modeling of preference and importance
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Voting in Combinatorial Domains: What Logic and AI Have to Say
JELIA '08 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence
Compact preference representation and Boolean games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Strongly decomposable voting rules on multiattribute domains
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Voting on multiattribute domains with cyclic preferential dependencies
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
A dichotomy theorem on the existence of efficient or neutral sequential voting correspondences
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents
Communications of the ACM
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Vote elicitation with probabilistic preference models: empirical estimation and cost tradeoffs
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Aggregation of multiple judgments for evaluating ordered lists
ECIR'2010 Proceedings of the 32nd European conference on Advances in Information Retrieval
Binary aggregation with integrity constraints
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Robust approximation and incremental elicitation in voting protocols
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
A MAS Approach to Course Offering Determination
WI-IAT '12 Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 03
Bribery in voting with CP-nets
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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In many real-world collective decision problems, the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of finite value domains for each of a given set of variables. The prohibitive size of such domains makes it practically impossible to represent preference relations explicitly. Now, AI has been developing languages for representing preferences on such domains in a succinct way, exploiting structural properties such as conditional preferential independence. Here we reconsider voting and aggregation rules in the case where voters' preferences have a common preferential independence structure, and address the decompossition a voting rule or an aggregation function following a linear order over variables.