Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Voting on multiattribute domains with cyclic preferential dependencies
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Hybrid elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Vote and aggregation in combinatorial domains with structured preferences
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Bribery in voting with CP-nets
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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Voting on multiple related issues is an important and difficult problem. The key difficulty is that the number of alternatives is exponential in the number of issues, and hence it is infeasible for the agents to rank all the alternatives. A simple approach is to vote on the issues one at a time, in sequence; however, a drawback is that the outcome may depend on the order in which the issues are voted upon and decided, which gives the chairperson some control over the outcome of the election because she can strategically determine the order. While this is undeniably a negative feature of sequential voting, in this paper we temper this judgment by showing that the chairperson's control problem is, in most cases, computationally hard.