Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting

Authors:
Vincent Conitzer
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, Duke University, Durham, USA 27708
Venue:
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2010

Citing 89
Cited 2

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Abstract

In a combinatorial auction, a set of items is for sale, and agents can bid on subsets of these items. In a voting setting, the agents decide among a set of alternatives by having each agent rank all the alternatives. Many of the key research issues in these two domains are similar. The aim of this paper is to give a convenient side-by-side comparison that will clarify the relation between the domains, and serve as a guide to future research.