Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
False-name-proofness in online mechanisms
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
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We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have been decided, withdraw some of her false-name identities (have some of her false-name identities refuse to pay). While these withdrawn identities will not obtain the items they won, their initial presence may have been beneficia to the agent's other identities. We defin a mechanism to be false-name-proof with withdrawal (FNPW) if the aforementioned manipulation is never beneficial FNPW is a stronger condition than false-name-proofness (FNP). We discuss the relation between FNP and FNPW in general combinatorial auction settings. We also propose the maximum marginal value item pricing (MMVIP) mechanism, which we prove is FNPW. (The full version contains a number of other results.)