Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Online auctions with re-usable goods
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Automated online mechanism design and prophet inequalities
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Online mechanism design for electric vehicle charging
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
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In real electronic markets, each bidder arrives and departs over time. Thus, such a mechanism that must make decisions dynamically without knowledge of the future is called an online mechanism. In an online mechanism, it is very unlikely that the mechanism designer knows the number of bidders beforehand or can verify the identity of all of them. Thus, a bidder can easily submit multiple bids (false-name bids) using different identifiers (e.g., different e-mail addresses). In this paper, we formalize false-name manipulations in online mechanisms and identify a simple property called (value, time, identifier)-monotonicity that characterizes the allocation rules of false-name-proof online auction mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on false-name-proof online mechanisms. Furthermore, we develop a new false-name-proof online auction mechanism for k identical items. When k = 1, this mechanism corresponds to the optimal stopping rule of the secretary problem where the number of candidates is unknown. We show that the competitive ratio of this mechanism for efficiency is 4 and independent from k by assuming that only the distribution of bidders' arrival times is known and that the bidders are impatient.