A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A robust combinatorial auction mechanism against shill bidders
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Expressive commerce and its application to sourcing
IAAI'06 Proceedings of the 18th conference on Innovative applications of artificial intelligence - Volume 2
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Incentives for expressing opinions in online polls
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Pseudonyms in Cost-Sharing Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Algorithms and theory of computation handbook
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
False-name-proofness in social networks
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
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In open, anonymous environments such as the Internet, mechanism design is complicated by the fact that a single agent can participate in the mechanism under multiple identifiers. One way to address this is to design false-name-proof mechanisms, which choose the outcome in such a way that agents have no incentive to use more than one identifier. Unfortunately, there are inherent limitations on what can be achieved with false-name-proof mechanisms, and at least in some cases, these limitations are crippling. An alternative approach is to verify the identities of all agents. This imposes significant overhead and removes any benefits from anonymity. In this paper, we propose a middle ground. Based on the reported preferences, we check, for various subsets of the reports, whether the reports in the subset were all submitted by different agents. If they were not, then we discard some of them. We characterize when such a limited verification protocol induces false-name-proofness for a mechanism, that is, when the combination of the mechanism and the verification protocol gives the agents no incentive to use multiple identifiers. This characterization leads to various optimization problems for minimizing verification effort. We study how to solve these problems. Throughout, we use combinatorial auctions (using the Clarke mechanism) and majority voting as examples.