Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Manipulation-resistant recommender systems through influence limits
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
False-name-proofness in social networks
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
False-name-proofness in facility location problem on the real line
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
False-name-proof mechanism design without money
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Cloning in elections: finding the possible winners
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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A (randomized, anonymous) voting rule maps any multiset of totalorders (aka. votes) over a fixed set of alternatives to aprobability distribution over these alternatives. A voting rule fis false-name-proof if no voter ever benefits from casting morethan one vote. It is anonymity-proof if it satisfies voluntaryparticipation and it is false-name-proof. We show that the class ofanonymity-proof neutral voting rules consists exactly of the rulesof the following form. With some probability k f ∈ [0,1], the rule chooses an alternativeuniformly at random. With probability 1 − k f ,the rule first draws a pair of alternatives uniformly at random. Ifevery vote prefers the same alternative between the two (and thereis at least one vote), then the rule chooses that alternative.Otherwise, the rule flips a fair coin to decide between the twoalternatives. We also show how the characterization changes ifgroup strategy-proofness is added as a requirement.