On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming
Mathematics of Operations Research
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
False-name-proof mechanism design without money
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
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Matching a set of agents to a set of objects has many real applications. One well-studied framework is that of priority-based matching, in which each object is assumed to have a priority order over the agents. The Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top-Trading-Cycle (TTC) mechanisms are the best-known strategy-proof mechanisms. However, in highly anonymous environments, the set of agents is not known a priori, and it is more natural for objects to instead have priorities over characteristics (e.g., the student's GPA or home address). In this paper, we extend the model so that each agent reports not only its preferences over objects, but also its characteristic. We derive results for various notions of strategy-proofness and false-name-proofness, corresponding to whether agents can only report weaker characteristics or also incomparable or stronger ones, and whether agents can only claim objects allocated to their true accounts or also those allocated to their fake accounts. Among other results, we show that DA and TTC satisfy a weak version of false-name-proofness. Furthermore, DA also satisfies a strong version of false-name-proofness, while TTC fails to satisfy it without an acyclicity assumption on priorities.