Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
On approximating optimal auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Combinatorial Auctions
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Methods for boosting revenue in combinatorial auctions
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Approximating revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
False-name bids in combinatorial auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Beyond quasi-linear utility: strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Characterization of false-name-proof social choice mechanisms
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Algorithms and theory of computation handbook
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Inter-domain pricing: challenges and possible approaches
International Journal of Network Management
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Intuitively, one might expect that a seller's revenue from an auction weakly increases as the number of bidders grows, as this increases competition. However, it is known that for combinatorial auctions that use the VCG mechanism, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to which this problem can occur under other dominant-strategy combinatorial auction mechanisms. Our main result is that such failures of "revenue monotonicity" are not limited to mechanisms that achieve efficient allocations. Instead, they can occur under any dominant-strategy direct mechanism that sets prices using critical values, and that always chooses an allocation that cannot be augmented to make some bidder better off, while making none worse off.