Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
An average-case budget-non-negative double auction protocol
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
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Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids
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False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation
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In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e.g., multiple e-mail addresses). If only one good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional profit by using multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple goods are sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under fictitious names can be profitable. A bid made under a fictitious name is called a false-name bid. This article gives a brief introducion on false-name bids in combinatorial auctions.