AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
Concurrent auctions across the supply chain
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
ICDCS '00 Proceedings of the The 20th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems ( ICDCS 2000)
Issues in computational Vickrey auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce - Special issue: Intelligent agents for electronic commerce
Designing Mechanisms for E-Commerce Security: An Example from Sealed-Bid Auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Protocol/Mechanism Design for Cooperation/Competition
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
The sequential auction problem on eBay: an empirical analysis and a solution
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
False-name bids in combinatorial auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Beyond quasi-linear utility: strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem
Artificial Intelligence
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
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This paper develops a new ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol that has the following characteristics: (i) it has an open format, and (ii) sincere bidding is an equilibrium strategy even if the marginal values of each agent can increase and agents can submit false-name bids. False-name bids are bids submitted under fictitious names such as multiple e-mail addresses, which can be done easily on the Internet. This is the first protocol that has both of these characteristics. Our simulation results indicate that the developed protocol obtains a social surplus close to Pareto efficient.