Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Economic mechanism design for computerized agents
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
The Role of Reputation Systems in Reducing On-Line Auction Fraud
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Recommending trusted online auction sellers using social network analysis
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
E-auction in China: the case of Taobao
International Journal of Electronic Finance
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Account-Sharing Detection Through Keystroke Dynamics Analysis
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Vickrey vs. eBay: Why Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions Lead to More Realistic Price-Demand Functions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
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The use of computing technology is a necessary but not sufficient approach to enhancing e-commerce security. It should be supplemented by the application of economic mechanisms to design e-processes that discourage the exploitation of security weaknesses. Mechanisms that function well in traditional commerce should be updated to accommodate new problems raised in e-commerce, such as the lack of authentication. As an illustration, thiezezs research focuses on on-line auction mechanisms and develops a Leveled Partition Set (LPS) protocol for multi-unit sealed-bid auctions. LPS prevents on-line false-name bidding whereby bidders increase their utility by splitting their bids for a large bundle to several smaller bundles under false identities.