A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids

Authors:
Atsushi Iwasaki;Makoto Yokoo;Kenji Terada
Affiliations:
Graduate School of Information Science and Electrical Engineering, Kyushu University, Hakozaki 6-10-1, Higashi-ku, Fukuoka, 812-8581, Japan;Graduate School of Information Science and Electrical Engineering, Kyushu University, Hakozaki 6-10-1, Higashi-ku, Fukuoka, 812-8581, Japan;NTT East Corporation, Research and Development Center, 1-9-1 Kounan, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 108-8019, Japan
Venue:
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Year:
2005

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Abstract

This paper develops a new ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol that has the following characteristics: (i) it has an open format, and (ii) sincere bidding is an equilibrium strategy even if the marginal values of each agent can increase and agents can submit false-name bids. False-name bids are bids submitted under fictitious names such as multiple e-mail addresses, which can be done easily on the Internet. This is the first protocol that has both of these characteristics. Our simulation results indicate that the developed protocol obtains a social surplus close to Pareto efficient.