Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
A Branch-and-Price Algorithm and New Test Problems for Spectrum Auctions
Management Science
An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem
Artificial Intelligence
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
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Auctions have become enormously popular in recent years. A typical example is spectrum auction for distributions of licenses for electromagnetic spectrum based on simultaneous ascending-price auction. Even though this auction is popular, it is not robust against some strategic manipulations of buyers. While allowing buyers to submit alternative choices (due dates in this paper) in XOR bids, we propose a new auction mechanism called simultaneous ascending-price auction with option proposal (SAA-OP). One of the important characteristics of this mechanism is that there are two types of auction winners: an auctioneer chooses winners (exact fulfillments) or buyers take options proposed by the auctioneer (partial fulfillments). Due to this characteristic, the proposing mechanism implements an ex-post efficient equilibrium.