Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Communications of the ACM
Decision procedures for multiple auctions
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 2
Understanding the Digital Economy: Data. Tools, and Research
Understanding the Digital Economy: Data. Tools, and Research
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Sequential Auctions for the Allocation of Resources with Complementarities
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Negotiated Collusion: Modeling Social Language and its Relationship Effects in Intelligent Agents
User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction
Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Developing a bidding agent for multiple heterogeneous auctions
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Frictionless Commerce? A Comparison of Internet and Conventional Retailers
Management Science
Trust and etiquette in high-criticality automated systems
Communications of the ACM - Human-computer etiquette
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Exploring bidding strategies for market-based scheduling
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Online auctions with re-usable goods
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Snipers, Shills, and Sharks: eBay and Human Behavior
Snipers, Shills, and Sharks: eBay and Human Behavior
Bidding optimally in concurrent second-price auctions of perfectly substitutable goods
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Coordination and costly preference elicitation in electronic markets
Coordination and costly preference elicitation in electronic markets
Expressive commerce and its application to sourcing
IAAI'06 Proceedings of the 18th conference on Innovative applications of artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Chain: a dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Addressing the Exposure Problem of Bidding Agents Using Flexibly Priced Options
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Preference-based English reverse auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Online mechanism design for electric vehicle charging
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
A robust multi-unit ascending-price auction with complementarities against strategic manipulation
PRIMA'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems
Artificial Intelligence
Using Priced Options to Solve the Exposure Problem in Sequential Auctions
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Hi-index | 0.00 |
The sequential auction problem is commonplace in open, electronic marketplaces such as eBay. This is the problem where a buyer has no dominant strategy in bidding across multiple auctions when the buyer would have a simple, truth-revealing strategy if there was but a single auction event. Our model allows for multiple, distinct goods and market dynamics with buyers and sellers that arrive over time. Sellers each bring a single unit of a good to the market while buyers can have values on bundles of goods. We model each individual auction as a second-price (Vickrey) auction and propose an options-based, proxied solution to provide price and winner-determination coordination across auctions. While still allowing for temporally uncoordinated market participation, this options-based approach solves the sequential auction problem and provides truthful bidding as a weakly dominant strategy for buyers. An empirical study suggests that this coordination can enable a significant efficiency and revenue improvement over the current eBay market design, and highlights the effect on performance of complex buyer valuations (buyers with substitutes and complements valuations) and varying the market liquidity.