Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation

Authors:
Chaki Ng;David C. Parkes;Margo Seltzer
Affiliations:
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA;Harvard University, Cambridge, MA;Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Venue:
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Year:
2003

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Abstract

We consider the problem of designing fast and strategyproof exchanges for dynamic resource allocation problems in distributed systems. The exchange is implemented as a sequence of auctions, with dynamically arriving requests from agents matched with each auction. Each auction is associated with some consignment of the resources from a single seller. We provide a simple Virtual Worlds (VW) construction, that extends a fast and strategyproof mechanism for a single auction to apply to this sequence-of-auctions setting. Rather than match each buyer with a single auction, the VW mechanism allows buyers to be considered for multiple auctions while retaining strategyproofness.