Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Scheduling Divisible Loads in Parallel and Distributed Systems
Scheduling Divisible Loads in Parallel and Distributed Systems
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Globally Distributed Computation over the Internet - The POPCORN Project
ICDCS '98 Proceedings of the The 18th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Scheduling Divisible Loads on Star and Tree Networks: Results and Open Problems
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Multiround Algorithms for Scheduling Divisible Loads
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
A Strategyproof Mechanism for Scheduling Divisible Loads in Distributed Systems
ISPDC '05 Proceedings of the The 4th International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Computing
Autonomous nodes and distributed mechanisms
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
Algorithmic mechanism design for load balancing in distributed systems
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics
An incentive-based distributed mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in tree networks
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
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Divisible Load Theory (DLT) considers the scheduling of arbitrarily partitionable loads in distributed systems. The underlying assumption of DLT is that the processors are obedient (i.e., they do not "cheat" the protocol), which is unrealistic when the processors are owned by autonomous, self-interested organizations that have no a priori motivation for cooperation and which strive to maximize their own welfare. In this scenario, they will manipulate the algorithm if it is beneficial to do so. In this paper we propose a strategyproof mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in bus networks without control processors. We augment DLT with incentives so that it is to the benefit of a processor to truthfully report its processing capacity and to process its assignment at full capacity. The mechanism provides incentives to processors for reporting deviants and issues fines to deviants, which results in abated willingness to deviate.