Autonomous nodes and distributed mechanisms

Authors:
John C. Mitchell;Vanessa Teague
Affiliations:
Stanford University, Stanford, CA;Stanford University, Stanford, CA
Venue:
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
Year:
2002

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Abstract

We extend distributed algorithmic mechanism design by considering a new model that allows autonomous nodes executing a distributed mechanism to strategically deviate from the prescribed protocol. Our goal is to motivate agents to contribute to a global objective and resist disruption by a limited number of malicious irrational agents, augmenting market incentives with cryptographic primitives to make certain forms of behavior computationally infeasible. Several techniques for distributing market computation among autonomous agents are illustrated using a marginal cost mechanism for multicast cost sharing from.