AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
ICDCS '00 Proceedings of the The 20th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems ( ICDCS 2000)
Robust Double Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
ICDCS '01 Proceedings of the The 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Economic mechanism design for computerized agents
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
Strategies and Behaviours of Agents in Multi-phased Negotiations
EC-WEB '02 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on E-Commerce and Web Technologies
Proceedings of the 5th Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi Agents: Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Protocol/Mechanism Design for Cooperation/Competition
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
A new approach to detecting shill bids in e-auctions
International Journal of Intelligent Information and Database Systems
An approach to detecting shill-biddable allocations in combinatorial auctions
DEECS'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Data Engineering Issues in E-Commerce and Services
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This paper presents a new multi-unit auction protocol (IR protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce and a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for executing auctions, the possibility of a new type of cheating called false-name bids has been pointed out. A false-name bid is a bid submitted under a fictitious name. A protocol called LDS has been developed for combinatorial auctions of multiple different items and has proven to be robust against false-name bids. Although we can modify the LDS protocol to handle multi-unit auctions, in which multiple units of an identical item are auctioned, the protocol is complicated and requires the auctioneer to carefully predetermine the combination of bundles to obtain a high social surplus or revenue. For the auctioneer, our newly developed IR protocol is easier to use than the LDS, since the combination of bundles is automatically determined in a flexible manner according to the declared evaluation values of agents. The evaluation results show that the IR protocol can obtain a better social surplus than that obtained by the LDS protocol.