The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: a configurable auction server for human and software agents
AGENTS '98 Proceedings of the second international conference on Autonomous agents
Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue on economics of electronic commerce
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
ICDCS '00 Proceedings of the The 20th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems ( ICDCS 2000)
Agent-mediated electronic commerce: a survey
The Knowledge Engineering Review
Economic mechanism design for computerized agents
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
An average-case budget-non-negative double auction protocol
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
A Designated Bid Reverse Auction for Agent-Based Electronic Commerce
IEA/AIE '02 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Industrial and engineering applications of artificial intelligence and expert systems: developments in applied artificial intelligence
A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Protocol/Mechanism Design for Cooperation/Competition
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: Decision theory and game theory in agent design
An auction method for resource allocation in computational grids
Future Generation Computer Systems
Robust multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Bundle design in robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
A greedy double auction mechanism for grid resource allocation
JSSPP'10 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Job scheduling strategies for parallel processing
When multi-touch meets streaming
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Multimedia
A repeated Bayesian auction game for cognitive radio spectrum sharing scheme
Computer Communications
| Hi-index | 0.01 |
Abstract: Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce (EC) and a promising field for applying agent technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for large-scale auctions, we must consider the possibility of a new type of cheating, i.e., a bidder trying to profit from submitting several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). Double auctions are an important subclass of auction protocols that permit multiple buyers and sellers to bid to exchange a good, and have been widely used in stock, bond, and foreign exchange markets. If there exists no false-name bid, a double auction protocol called PMD protocol has proven to be dominant-strategy incentive compatible. On the other hand, if we consider the possibility of false-name bids, the PMD protocol is no longer dominant-strategy incentive compatible. In this paper, we develop a new double auction protocol called the Threshold Price Double auction (TPD) protocol, which is dominant-strategy incentive compatible even if participants can submit false-name bids. The characteristics of the TPD protocol is that the number of trades and prices of exchange are controlled by the threshold price. Simulation results show that this protocol can achieve a social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient.