Bundle design in robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids

  • Authors:

  • Makoto Yokoo;Yuko Sakurai;Shigeo Matsubara

  • Affiliations:

  • NTT Communication Science Laboratories, Kyoto, Japan;NTT Communication Science Laboratories, Kyoto, Japan;NTT Communication Science Laboratories, Kyoto, Japan

  • Venue:
  • IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

This paper presents a method for designing bundles in a combinatorial auction protocol that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce and a promising field for applying AI technologies. However, the possibility of a new type of cheating called a false-name bid, i.e., a bid submitted under a fictitious name, has been pointed out. A protocol called Leveled Division Set (LDS) protocol that is robust against false-name bids has been developed. However, this protocol requires the auctioneer to define a leveled division set. A leveled division set is a series of division sets, where a division set is a set of divisions and a division is a combination of bundles of goods. We need to solve a very complicated optimization problem to construct a leveled division set in order to obtain a good social surplus. We have developed a heuristic method for overcoming this problem. In this method, we first find a good division with a winner determination algorithm, and then construct a leveled division set by using this division as a seed. Through a simulation, we showthat our method can obtain a social surplus that is very close to optimal.